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RE: Advisory Opinion 92-01
       Arkansas Bar Association


DATE: December 2, 1992


SUBJECT: Referral Fees

     Referral fees are historically defined as fees that are apportioned between lawyers, or are paid by one lawyer to another lawyer. Such fees have traditionally been looked on askance by
the legal profession as being a "finder's fee" or "forwarding fee" for attorneys who are perceived as merely scouting for desirable clients. Such a view, if ever appropriate, is certainly not justified now.

     The ethical law on referral fees changed dramatically on January 1, 1986, with the adoption of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 1.5(e) provides for three basic scenarios.

          1) The referring attorney may assist the client in locating an               attorney who is able to represent the client. Typically               attorneys do this on a gratis basis, accepting no fee
              from the client, accepting no responsibility for the work               subsequently performed by the accepting attorney, and               performing no other work for the client in the matter.               However, the referring attorney may charge the client a fee,               reasonable under Rule 1.5 (a), for the services provided in               locating the accepting attorney. Any fee received would               come from the client directly, and therefore would not fall into               the commonly defined category of a "referral fee." in this               scenario the only responsibility accepted by the referring               attorney is to carry out competently the task of selecting the               second attorney.

          2) The referring attorney may recommend to the client that the               matter be handled by, or in connection with, another attorney,               whether a larger firm, another lawyer in the same community,               or a "specialist" in a metropolitan area. Implicit in that               recommendation is that the first lawyer will be paid out of the               fee to be received by the second lawyer. Rule 1.5(e) places               three requirements on a proper fee. (1) The client must be               properly and timely informed of the participation of the               second attorney and must not raise any objection consent.               The attorney should counsel the client as to the advantages               and disadvantages of bringing in a second attorney. (2) The               total fee must be reasonable. If the first attorney had               accepted the matter on a 30% contingency fee, presumably               that percentage is reasonable. To increase that percentage               because of the addition of a second attorney would likewise,               presumably, be unreasonable. The referral fee is to be paid               out of the attorneys' share, not to be an additional charge               against the client. (3) The distribution of the fee between the               attorneys is in proportion to the services performed by each               lawyer. For example, one attorney may handle pleading and               discovery; the other, hearings and the trial. On the other hand,               one attorney may simply provide as a hometown conduit of               information to the client, and the second attorney may be               entrusted with the entire litigation. The client need not be               informed as to the manner of distribution between the               attorneys. If the attorneys adopt this approach, that is the               division of the fee based upon the time and effort put into the               case, the attorneys are responsible, from a standpoint of               malpractice liability and disciplinary sanctions, for their own               efforts, but are not responsible under rule 1.5(e) for the work               of the other attorney. (Whether they might be responsible for               the acts or omissions of the other attorney based upon their               knowledge or their involvement according to principles of the               common law is a question not to be answered by this               opinion, for questions of law are outside the scope of this               committee).

           3) This approach is perhaps the most common and, since                1986, has been specifically authorized by Rule 1.5(e). This                approach is identical to the second except for the third                element. The attorneys may divide the fee on any basis they                wish, regardless of how much or how little work (if any) either                attorney does, provided that the two attorneys enter into a                written agreement with the client. The agreement should                expressly state and clearly notify the client that each lawyer
               accepts joint responsibility for the complete representation.                See Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 512 (1986). The                agreement should be signed by the client. The statement                provides a legal basis for the client to sue either attorney for                alleged malpractice committed by the other. The statement                in effect says that the attorneys are treating themselves as                ad hoc partners in a single 'firm for this particular                representation. In particular, the referring attorney remains                fully responsible to the client for any deficiencies in the                representation by the lawyer who has been brought into the                representation. Again, the ultimate distribution of the fee                between the attorneys need not be disclosed to the client.

     In both the second and third scenarios, the attorneys are also acting as part of a single firm for purposes of disciplinary responsibility for the particular matter. See the fourth paragraph of the Comment to Rule 1.5. Rule 5.1 requires that an attorney with supervisory authority over another attorney must take reasonable efforts to ensure that the other conforms to the ethical standards. The comment to Rule 5.1 states in the fourth paragraph: ". . . . a partner in charge of a particular matter ordinarily has direct authority over other firm lawyers engaged in the matter. . . . The supervisor is required to intervene to prevent avoidable consequences of misconduct if the supervisor knows that the misconduct occurred." Comparable standards apply when the lawyers are linked by a referral agreement.

     Although typically analyzed in terms of the commencement of personal injury cases, division of fees among lawyers may also be appropriate when the lawyer withdraws from a case and is replaced by another, when one lawyer is professionally disciplined during the life of the agreement, or when an out-of-state co-counsel is involved. See ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct 41:701 (1991).

     Referral fees can play a valuable role in service to the public. Without referral fees, younger attorneys or attorneys in small communities or smaller firms may be reluctant to accept cases perceiving themselves inadequate to serve the client effectively. Conversely, such attorneys may be reluctant to associate another lawyer or refer to another lawyer, because of the loss of a fee or a reduced fee. Such a decision may deprive the client of a more qualified attorney. See Hazard, The Law of Lawyerinq (2d Ed. 1991) page 121. With proper knowledge and use of referral fees, those attorneys may have a role in litigation, may continue to serve their clients, may benefit from the tutelage of more experienced attorneys, and may be compensated.

NOTICE

     "This is an opinion only of the Arkansas Bar Association which is a voluntary association of attorneys licensed to practice in the State of Arkansas, and reliance thereon is voluntary and relieves any Association member from liability for the content hereof. This opinion is intended to be the Association's best interpretation of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as promulgated by the Supreme Court of Arkansas as that code applies to the written facts presented to the Committee."

ARKANSAS BAR ASSOCIATION


By:_______________________________
     Howard W. Brill
     Reporter for Professional Ethics
     and Grievances Committee

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